The Republic of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes to Washington by Simon, William H.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2013 
The Republic of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes to Washington 
William H. Simon 
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William H. Simon, The Republic of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes to Washington, BOSTON REVIEW, VOL. 38, 
NO. 4, P. 46, 2013; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 13-353 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1811 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





THE REPUBLIC OF CHOOSING 





William H. Simon 
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law 














THE REPUBLIC OF CHOOSING 
A Behaviorist Goes to Washington 
 
William H. Simon 
 
 
 Cass Sunstein’s book Simpler recounts the author’s efforts during his tenure in the first 
Obama administration to apply the policy tools he helped derive from behavioral economics.  In 
this review, I suggest that, while Sunstein reports some notable achievements, he exaggerates the 
utility of the behaviorist toolkit.  Behaviorist-inspired interventions are marginal to most of the 
largest policy problems, and they played little role in the Obama administration’s most 
important initiatives.  The book also reflects a misguided political strategy.  
 
 
Cass R. Sunstein 
Simpler: The Future of Government 
Simon & Schuster, $26 (cloth) 
 
 
 Cass Sunstein went to Washington with the aim of putting some theory into practice. As 
administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) during President 
Obama’s first term, he drew on the behavioral economics he helped develop as an academic. In 
his new book, Simpler, he reports on these efforts and elaborates a larger vision in which they 
exemplify “the future of government.”  
 Sunstein’s approach is inspired by a famous body of survey and laboratory research 
suggesting that individual decision-making is often irrational. For example, in surveys people 
express a willingness to pay more for insurance that covers injuries from terrorism than for 
insurance that covers injuries full stop, although logically the latter must be more valuable. This 
tendency appears to be a manifestation of “the availability heuristic”: mention of terrorism 
summons up more vivid imagery than mention of injury in the abstract. In the laboratory, when 
experimenters give subjects a mug and ask them how much they would sell it for, the subjects 
tend to demand considerably more than they offer to pay for the mug when, instead of giving 
them the mug, the experimenters give them cash and an opportunity to buy the mug—an 
“endowment effect.” And many people who choose the one-ounce piece of chocolate when 
offered a choice between one- and two-ounce pieces choose the two-ounce piece when they also 
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have a three-ounce option. It’s easier to choose the two-ounce piece when it is the middle 
choice—a “framing effect.” In general, the behaviorists find that people have strong tendencies 
to drift with the status quo rather than opt for change, to succumb unreflectively to rhetoric and 
imagery, and to excessively discount the future. 
 Such findings challenge libertarian and economistic accounts that portray individual 
choices as virtually always rational, or at least, as only occasionally and unpredictably irrational. 
The behaviorists suggest that irrationality is both routine and predictable. Sunstein, a long-time 
defender of liberal politics, sees this research as supporting government intervention into private 
economic arrangements.  Yet, he has also absorbed the critiques of New-Deal-style bureaucracy, 
which insist that it does not follow from the fact that individuals choose sub-optimally that 
government can do better. Although the government may know that choices are biased in a 
particular direction, it may not be able to determine reliably whether that direction is contrary to 
the interests of the choosers. Some of the choices in the behaviorist studies, such as paying more 
for insurance with less coverage, are clearly against the choosers’ interests. But often, as with the 
chocolates, we cannot be sure, even after identifying cognitive bias, what the best choice is. 
Sunstein’s contribution is to elaborate intermediate interventions that protect against unconscious 
bias without categorically pre-empting choice.  
 Simpler reports some notable achievements, but it exaggerates the practical value of the 
behaviorist toolkit. The Obama administration’s most important policy initiatives make only 
minor use of it. Despite its upbeat tone, the book implies an oddly constrained conception of the 
means and ends of government. It sometimes calls to mind a doctor putting on a cheerful face to 
say that, while there is little he can do to arrest the disease, he will try to make the patient as 
comfortable as possible. 
*** 
 
The book recounts a variety of Obama administration efforts to make government more 
transparent and user-friendly. These efforts have improved access to aggregate government data, 
enabled citizens to locate more of the specific data government has collected about them, 
provided clearer accounts of government activity, enhanced the intelligibility of government 
regulations and applications, and distributed helpful guidance on matters ranging from nutrition 
to energy efficiency. 
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These reforms are admirable, but there is nothing novel about them in principle, and they 
have been influenced only peripherally by behavioral research. The initiatives most identified 
with behavioral research involve what Sunstein calls “nudges.” A nudge seeks to influence 
choices by calibrating the way they are presented. 
 There are two types of nudges. The first concerns disclosure. The government can require 
sellers to more saliently and clearly communicate key factors the consumer might otherwise 
overlook or misunderstand. So, as a condition of government-backed loans to their students, 
vocational schools must prominently disclose to applicants their graduation rates and the 
employment rates of their graduates. Airlines must quote prices inclusive of airport fees and 
taxes. Auto dealers must report “annual fuel cost” as prominently as the less informative “miles 
per gallon.” 
 The second type of nudge involves changing the default rule—the rule that dictates what 
happens if the individual does not make a relevant choice. The most famous example concerns 
employer-sponsored retirement savings plans. The traditional default rule is that if the employee 
fails to enroll, she does not participate; the employer does not divert part of her pay to a tax-
advantaged savings account. But behavioral science teaches—if we didn’t know it already—that 
people have biases in favor of the status quo and that they tend to over-discount their future 
needs. People who don’t save run a high risk of financial distress in retirement and are likely to 
regret their prior choices. So it makes more sense for the default rule to be automatic enrollment. 
If the employee does not want to save, she can take initiative to opt out, but if she drifts instead 
of choosing, the default rule leads her to save. Sunstein reports proudly that recent regulations 
encourage employers to shift from the traditional opt-in design to an opt-out one. 
 To Sunstein, nudges have two sorts of advantages over mandatory regulation. First, they 
constrain liberty less. A mandatory rule might deny government-backed loans for tuition at 
schools with low graduation rates or force participation in employer-sponsored retirement 
programs. A nudge leaves choice open. To be sure, the nudge represents an exercise of 
government power on the basis of official judgments about people’s interests, but that power is 
exercised weakly and the judgments are more tentative than a mandatory rule would require. If 
nudges are paternalistic, they are “soft” paternalism rather than the hard paternalism of 
mandatory rules.  
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 Second, effective nudges demand less government information than effective mandatory 
rules. A nudging government still needs some basis for deciding what direction to nudge in, but 
as long as individuals are free to push back, they can escape the effect of the government’s 
mistakes if they care enough to make an effort. Moreover, nudges permit individuals to act on 
particular tastes or take account of unusual circumstances in a way that a uniform rule would not. 
Even if it is in the interests of employees generally to save more, certain employees may have 
good reasons for not doing so at a given moment. Maybe they have extraordinary medical bills 
or need a down payment for a house. A regulator writing a mandatory rule could not factor in 
such varying circumstances, but a nudge does the trick. 
*** 
 Yet, while Sunstein gives many examples of plausible nudges, most of them, like the 
retirement-plan default, seem to have fairly modest impacts.  Only twenty percent of the income 
of elderly retirees comes from pension funds; most of the rest comes from the traditional hard-
paternalist Social Security program.  You can get an idea of how limited the domain of the 
behaviorist tools is by surveying the Obama administration’s most ambitious domestic 
initiatives: the Food Safety Modernization Act, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a Obamacare), and 
Race to the Top and related education initiatives. Nudges do not play central roles in any of 
them. 
 Choice architecture plays no role in the food safety statute. The law could have created a 
rating system that advised consumers of the probability that food from a given processor would 
make them sick, while permitting processors to market and consumers to purchase low-rated 
products. (Some cities do something like that with restaurant sanitation regulation.) Instead, the 
law demands a high degree of safety from all processors and prohibits those who do not meet it 
from operating. On Sunstein’s criteria, there is no need for halfway measures because the 
government understanding of consumer interests is strong and there is little variation in relevant 
tastes. 
 Sunstein mentions in passing that choice-architecture tools will be useful in 
implementing the Affordable Care Act, and indeed the statute is chock full of nudges, including 
a requirement of automatic enrollment in employer health plans and a directive to the Food and 
Drug Administration to study standardized disclosure of risks and benefits of prescription drugs. 
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Not all of the choice-focused provisions seem desirable, however. Many people deplore the 
rejection of a single-payer insurance model in favor competitive private insurance plans. These 
critics think that a competitive regime will have higher costs and offer little valuable diversity.  
 In any event, the choice-enhancing features of the statute seem considerably less 
important than the features of the bill that are designed to narrow choice. Consumers no longer 
have the choice to remain uninsured.  This mandate reflects in part a hard paternalist belief that 
few people could rationally choose not to insure, as well as concerns about adverse selection – 
the tendency of relatively healthy people to undermine risk pooling by opting out.  Providers 
have less choice about which applicants they can reject -- none on the basis of pre-existing 
conditions; otherwise they would cream – competing on their ability to identify relatively healthy 
people rather than on the quality of their service.  If the Medicare cost controls work, they will 
necessarily narrow choices of drugs and services.   And the statute encourages states to restrict 
the rates insurers can charge.  Rate regulation arises from fear that insurance markets will 
become oligopolistic.  Disclosure is no antidote for monopoly power. 
 Dodd-Frank has a bigger role for choice architecture than do the other initiatives. It 
creates a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate consumer credit contracts, and no 
doubt much of the regulation will address disclosure and default matters. But the law is also 
likely to lead to choice-limiting prohibitions of abusive contract terms. More importantly, Dodd-
Frank is primarily an effort to avoid further financial system crises, and irrational consumer 
choices are not the major source of risk here. The most important causes of the recent crisis 
involved the externalization of risk by borrowers and lenders, ultimately to the federal 
government through its deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort, and too-big-to-fail bailout 
practices. Many risk-creating transactions, including consumer “liar loans” and no-down-
payment deals, were rational for the immediate parties. No amount of choice structuring in 
connection with a decision can reliably prevent harm that will occur to someone other than the 
decision-maker. Thus, the central thrust of Dodd-Frank is to constrain risk-taking by restricting 
financial institutions’ choices about such matters as proprietary trading and capital levels.  
 Finally, Race to the Top also has a choice feature. As a condition of eligibility for the 
relevant grants, states must make some provision for charter schools. Yet, the charter school 
requirements are very weak. The main thrust of the administration’s education initiatives is to 
induce states to adopt standards, data systems, diagnostic tests, and remedial interventions that 
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permit schools to engage in continuous re-assessment and adaptation of teaching practices—
what the regulations call “instructional improvement systems.” 
*** 
 The obverse of Sunstein’s preoccupation with choice architecture is his relative 
indifference to other approaches to making administration less rigid. Recall that among the 
problems Sunstein sees with conventional regulation are, first, that it mandates conduct in 
situations where the regulator doesn’t know with confidence what is the right thing to do, and 
second, that it is insufficiently sensitive to relevant local variations in taste or circumstances.  
 The most common way to deal with the first problem—insufficient information—is to 
build learning into the process of intervention: the regulator intervenes provisionally, studies the 
effects of her intervention, and adapts as she learns. It is commonplace for statutes to mandate or 
fund demonstration or pilot projects. More importantly, statutes often demand that both top 
administrators and frontline workers reassess and adjust their practices continuously. This 
approach is the central and explicit thrust of Race to the Top’s “instructional improvement 
systems,” and it recurs prominently in all the statutes mentioned so far. 
 These statutes also strive to accommodate local variation. Increasingly, regulation leaves 
regulated actors discretion over practices as long as they achieve minimally adequate measurable 
results. Thus, for example, the Food Safety Modernization Act does not mandate that the Food 
and Drug Administration prescribe how processing plants should operate. Rather, it provides that 
each processor formulate its own safety plan and that the FDA then measure the efficacy of the 
facility’s efforts against a set of indicators. Moreover, the U.S. federal structure is significantly 
responsive to the demands of learning and context. All four initiatives pay homage to the idea of 
states as “laboratories of democracy” by giving them significant roles, according them broad 
discretion as to how to perform them, and encouraging peer exchanges or central aggregation of 
information in ways that promote learning. 
 Sunstein knows all this and occasionally refers in the book to non-nudge forms of 
regulatory loosening, but they are not central for him. Why not? I can think of three reasons. 
 First, Sunstein seems overly impressed by methodological rigor. The studies that have 
influenced him have the glamor of scientific form and the force of controlled empiricism. But 
rigorous control comes at a cost. It is impossible in some circumstances and expensive in most 
others, and results are often ambiguous. Small changes in the intervention studied might have 
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produced very different results, and the experimental measures may not capture all the important 
effects.  Drug regulation is the regulatory field in which rigorous empiricism has played the most 
central role, but even here recent legislation has loosened requirements because of concerns that 
they excessively delay or increase the cost of new therapies. Elsewhere, it is often more 
productive to have people with diverse perspectives and knowledge pool information informally. 
The most common form of empiricism in most policy contexts is peer review in which 
knowledgeable people address problems or assess data deliberatively. In the business world, it is 
routine to re-assess strategy continuously in the light of whatever data is available without the 
benefit of formal empirical study. (Steve Jobs, whose commitment to “user-friendly” products 
Sunstein invokes, famously disdained market research.) 
Second, Sunstein, both as a teacher of administrative law and an OIRA official, has been 
immersed throughout his career in an anachronistic model of administrative government. The 
model was developed in the aftermath of the New Deal. It combines the New Deal understanding 
of administration as a matter of rigid and stable regulations with the conservative suspicion of 
government initiative. The model was thus designed to make it difficult to promulgate 
regulations, but it also can make it difficult to change them or at least easy to leave them in 
place. OIRA review is just one stage in the promulgation process, which often takes many years. 
Recent administrations have thickened OIRA’s role by requiring that agencies show that a 
proposed regulation’s benefits exceed its costs. In Republican administrations, OIRA has often 
stalled or strangled regulations by making implausible demands for methodological rigor or 
biased estimates of costs and benefits. 
Sunstein argues convincingly that cost-benefit analysis has no anti-regulatory bias in 
principle and is a helpful inducement to clarity and disciplined analysis. Nevertheless, the 
process remains heavily front-loaded. Efficacy must be rigorously demonstrated when a 
regulation is proposed, but there is little pressure to reassess once it is in place.  This process is 
poorly adapted to situations, such as those that prompted the four initiatives mentioned above, 
where there is strong uncertainty about the nature of a problem or its solution. For example, 
because bankers constantly find new ways to transact around regulatory constraints, no rule can 
anticipate all the risky moves that should be banned. What’s needed is a rule that mandates 
ongoing disclosure, review, and adaptation. Assessments of the efficacy of such a rule will be 
most valuable after it has been implemented. 
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To its credit, the Obama administration, under Sunstein’s influence, showed some 
awareness of the front-loading problem when it encouraged agencies to review already-
promulgated rules. But the review duty is vague and discretionary. The duty of upfront cost-
benefit analysis is detailed and categorical. Sunstein’s preoccupation with choice as a response to 
uncertainty seems to reflect an assumption that administrative practice has limited capacity to 
learn and adapt. In fact, however, the process of regulatory enactment he oversaw is partly 
responsible for this limitation. 
 Third, the modes of adaptation that Sunstein slights tend to employ collaborative 
decision-making. In one example that can be found in contexts as disparate as nuclear power 
regulation and child protective services, frontline workers are expected to depart from the rules 
when following them would not serve their purposes. But when they depart, they must trigger a 
review in which their actions are assessed by peers and supervisors. When the departures are 
sustained, the rules are rewritten to reflect the enhanced understanding. Decisions at all levels of 
the process involve deliberation by groups, often interdisciplinary ones. 
 It is not clear what Sunstein thinks about such processes. Simpler is focused on individual 
decision-making. Sunstein sees individual decision-making as prone to error but also as 
corrigible with the help of behaviorist learning. He says nothing here about the psychology of 
group decision-making. Elsewhere, however, he has written of it with skepticism. In particular, 
he has explored the pathologies of “group polarization”—the tendency of deliberators to become 
more extreme in their views when they deliberate with like-minded others—and “groupthink”—
the tendency of deliberators to repress or shape their views to conform to what they sense, 
sometimes inaccurately, is the dominant tendency in the group. 
Sunstein’s discussion of the challenges of group decision-making does not have the 
meliorist tone he adopts with respect to individual decision-making. Yet there is a social science 
literature suggesting that the problems of group decision-making are also treatable. For example, 
disinterested conveners or facilitators can improve deliberation by inducing presentation of 
balanced information and eliciting a full range of views. This literature also suggests that group 
decision-making can mitigate some of the pathologies the behaviorists find in individual 
decision-making. For example, the need of each group member to articulate and explain her 
position to the others forces self-consciousness that disrupts reliance on the unreflective thought 




 The nudge approach is influenced by ideological strategy as well as by social science. 
Sunstein seems to think that, for liberalism to reclaim the support it has lost in recent decades, 
the key task is to find common ground with the libertarian right. Hence he emphasizes the 
liberty-respecting dimension of choice-architecture regulation. A good part of the book engages 
libertarian critiques of government respectfully, indeed timidly. Sunstein also shares the 
libertarian focus on the danger of excessive, as opposed to insufficient, regulation. At OIRA, he 
enthusiastically implemented President Obama’s directive that agencies seek to identify 
“unnecessary” regulations for repeal or cutback, acknowledging only as an afterthought that 
there might be some regulations that should be strengthened.  
 Although Sunstein seems unchastened by it, there is evidence in his book that the 
ideological strategy is a failure. Libertarians have not been placated. Thirty-four Republican 
Senators voted against Sunstein’s confirmation. In a series of television rants, Glenn Beck 
portrayed Sunstein as “the most dangerous man in America,” attacking nudges as an insidious 
form of covert control. The economist Edward Glaeser made the same argument with less 
hyperbole: fiddling with choice architecture is more dangerous than enacting mandatory rules 
because the interventions are less noticeable and hence less likely to trigger political opposition. 
 Sunstein’s strategy misconceives where liberals should be looking for allies and what 
they need to do to win them. They should be looking in the center, not on the fringe, and the key 
to winning centrist support for liberal economic programs is to demonstrate their capacity to deal 
effectively with public problems, not to increase their accommodation of individual choice. Most 
Americans are not strong libertarians in economic matters. They do not see the capacity to 
choose among health insurance plans or to buy tax-free cigarettes as matters of liberty in any 
sense akin to rights of free speech, due process, political participation, or (for some) gun 
possession. They see choice in the economic domain largely in utilitarian terms. If regimes that 
allow choice leave most people better off, they are good. But choice should be readily sacrificed 
when doing so leads to more efficient provision of services. 
 Consider that the situation in current public discourse is virtually the opposite of that 
portrayed by Glaeser. Minor, indirect efforts to influence choices, such as Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s restriction on soda servings, often generate noisy debate about whether their trivial 
restraints on liberty can be justified. Because libertarian rhetoric is a kind of background music 
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in American culture, debates about paternalism have a certain entertainment value. Yet massive 
and directly coercive programs are rarely attacked as infringements of liberty and are often taken 
for granted. Social Security is the standout example, but there are many others, including 
Medicare, Unemployment Insurance, workplace safety, securities regulation, and defective-
product regulation. All these programs rest in substantial part on hard paternalist rationales. Yet 
when they are criticized, they are usually charged with ineffectiveness, not with infringing 
liberty. Even the right rarely attacks Social Security as paternalist anymore. Its complaints 
mainly assert that the program is inadequately funded and unlikely to deliver promised benefits. 
Social Security’s defenders spend most of their time showing that the program is sound or can be 
made so with modest reforms, not trying to make the program more palatable to libertarians. 
 The biggest current liability for liberals is that many people have lost faith in the capacity 
of government to solve the problems they care about. Perhaps the most prominent of these 
problems are unemployment, economic inequality, the deterioration of the natural environment, 
and national security. The behaviorist toolkit is not much help here. Sunstein’s account of the 
future of government has nothing to say about unemployment, inequality, or national security, 
and its contribution to environmental protection is limited to consumer labeling of cars and 
appliances.  Sunstein is right that government needs to be sensitive to the limits of its knowledge 
and understanding and that intervention needs to be more flexible and adaptive. But it seems 
unlikely that many major problems can be solved without more direct intervention and more 
collective decision-making than his strategy contemplates.  
 
